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Abstract
The structure and practices of justice systems in many parts of the world are 
undergoing what can be seen as a kind of revolution – and one not merely of 
professional interest to lawyers and judges. What we are seeing in nation after 
nation is a move from inquisitorial models of legal adjudication toward adversarial 
models. The discourses of adjudication in these contrasting types of trials are 
changing the ways in which lawyers, judges, and witnesses come to see their 
role in the process. The change has implications that extend far beyond the 
courtrooms in which trials play out, however. Because the shift from inquisito-
rial to adversarial justice models determines how legal narratives are created and 
deployed in trials, this change has the potential to impact popular perceptions of 
legal legitimacy, which in turn has implications for the relationship of citizens to 
their government and justice systems. This article will detail the global character 
of this change in the nature of the discourse used in legal adjudication and will 
explore its potential ramifications for legal professionals and for society more 
generally.
Keywords: adversarial, inquisitorial, narratives, procedural justice, trial models. 
1. Contrasting the adversarial and inquisitorial trial models
Modern global justice systems have been classified by comparative legal 
scholars as falling into one or the other model. Adversarial systems trace 
their heritage to the English common law system, whereas inquisitorial 
systems originated in Roman law. While both adversarial and inquisitorial 
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systems share many characteristics, they are marked by essential contrast-
ing features in how formal adjudication takes place and in the professional 
discourses that constitute its processes (van Koppen and Penrod 2003). 
1.1. Discursive characteristics of adversarial trials
In the adversarial system, the trial is thought of as a kind of contest 
between two equally-situated contestants, each of which is striving to pre-
vail. A common metaphor in adversarial justice is of the trial as a game in 
which the ‘playing field’ of the courtroom should ideally be a level one in 
which competing litigants are equivalently poised for the contest which 
will resolve the dispute. Just as it would be unfair in a sporting match to 
give one side an advantage in the game, the adversarial trial emphasizes the 
importance of the parties being treated as equals during the contest. 
Discursively, live oral testimony by witnesses is the preferred means 
of presenting evidence at trial, and the process of taking that testimony 
is under the control of the parties, through their proxies, the lawyers. 
Lawyers bring out the testimony of the witnesses by asking a series of 
questions to which the witness supplies answers. After the lawyer who has 
called the witness to the stand finishes this question-and-answer sequence, 
the lawyer representing the opposing party can ask the witness additional 
questions in cross-examination, which is designed to surface contradic-
tions, implausibilities, and qualifications in the testimony of the witness. 
During this process, the witness is limited to answering the questions 
asked by the lawyers. Witnesses are not permitted to give a free narrative of 
their evidence; nor can they comment on or argue with the questions that 
the lawyers put to them. 
In this adversarial trial model, the judge plays an even more limited 
role in developing the evidence than do the witnesses. Judges are not 
involved in pre-trial investigation, but instead only come into contact with 
the case once the matter is ready to be tried. At the trial, judges make rul-
ings about whether particular questions or answers are legally proper, but 
they do not decide what witnesses will be called or what evidence they will 
provide – that is the sole province of the lawyers. In fact, judges seldom 
interact directly with witnesses at all. If the adversarial trial is often meta-
phorically likened to a game, the lawyers are seen as serving in the role of 
athletic competitors, controlling the action of the match, and judges are 
limited to the passive role of the referee, simply deciding if the contestants 
are adhering to the rules of the game. 
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1.2. Discursive characteristics of inquisitorial trials
In contrast, the inquisitorial trial is imagined as a neutral inquiry conducted 
and controlled by a state official aimed at investigating and establishing the 
facts of a contested occurrence. Judicial officials, rather than the litigants 
and their lawyers, determine what information should be presented in the 
trial, in what order, and for what purpose. Although live oral testimony 
can be taken within the inquisitorial model, there is a much greater reli-
ance on written statements in comparison with the limited role that written 
evidence takes in the adversarial trial. Even when live witness testimony is 
taken in the inquisitorial courtroom, the questioning is conducted mainly, 
if not exclusively, by the judge, and is far less directed and controlling than 
in the adversarial witness examination format. The role of the inquisitorial 
judge is far more active in all phases of the dispute resolution process than 
in an adversarial process – the judge takes a central role in the garnering and 
assessment of evidence before the trial begins, decides how much weight to 
assign to evidence based on an assessment of its reliability and credibility, 
and in the final analysis, is the ultimate fact-finder in the case. This active 
role in the decision-making contrasts with the much more limited role of 
the adversarial trial judge, who rules on whether evidence is legally proper 
to be admitted but not on whether it should be believed, which is the sole 
province of the lay factfinders of the jury. In the inquisitorial system, lawyers 
play a relatively marginal role in the creation of the discourse of adjudication 
in comparison to the dominant role of lawyers in the adversarial system. 
2. Global distribution of the inquisitorial
 and adversarial trial models
The adversarial justice model has historically been the established system in 
both the United Kingdom, its birthplace, and in its colonies and former colo-
nial possessions, including the United States and Canada in North America; 
India, Pakistan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong in Asia; Australia and 
New Zealand in the South Pacific; and nations such as Nigeria, Uganda, 
Kenya, and Tanzania in Africa. The inquisitorial model, derived from the 
law of the Roman Empire, has historically held sway throughout continental 
Europe, as well as in countries that borrowed substantially in their modern 
legal systems directly or indirectly from those continental European systems, 
including the former Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc socialist countries, 
former colonies of continental European powers, and Japan, Korea, and China. 
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Those historical dividing lines have begun to break down in the past 
several decades. More and more countries that traditionally maintained 
inquisitorial systems have come to adopt in whole or in part many of 
the characteristics of adversarial systems. In Latin America, for example, 
which inherited the inquisitorial system from its Iberian colonial legacy, 
most countries today have adopted some version of an adversarial system 
to replace their former inquisitorial model, including the federal system of 
Argentina and a number of its provinces, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, many 
states in Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela (Pule cio-Boek 
2014, 87-89). Panama began the phased process of transition to an adver-
sarial model in 2011 (Watts and Ruff 2012), and a Mexican constitutional 
ruling requires all Mexican state and federal criminal justice systems to be 
converted fully to adversarial models by mid-2016 (Del Duca 2011, 131).
2.1. Latin America as an example of changing trial models
The Latin American example draws attention on how this transition 
from inquisitorial to adversarial justice models came about (see Langer 
2007; Pulecio-Boek 2014, 86-91). Beginning in the 1970s, a number of 
Latin American law professors, led by Argentinians Alberto Binder and 
Julio Maier, began to push for adoption of an adversarial criminal justice 
model to replace the traditional inquisitorial system, which they saw as 
corruptible and anti-democratic. These scholar-activists, through the aus-
pices of the Ibero-American Institute of Procedural Law, commenced a 
two-decade process of drafting what became the Model Criminal Code for 
Ibero-America, a code that once issued in 1988 proved highly influential in 
the wave of legal reform that followed in Latin America. This draft code 
coincided with efforts by the U.S. Agency for International Development 
to promote ‘rule of law’ projects throughout the world, including in Latin 
America (Langer 2007, 646-651; Pulecio-Boek 2014, 86). As a result of 
all of these reform efforts, most of the nations of Latin America adopted 
statutory models that replaced their historically traditional inquisitorial 
criminal justice systems with adversarial ones. As one scholar of Latin 
American court systems put it, “The current reforms constitute one of 
Latin America’s best-ever opportunities for adopting institutional changes 
capable of improving quality of life” (Bischoff 2003, 53).
It must be borne in mind that local political, economic, social and cul-
tural conditions exert a powerful pull on legal institutions in any country, 
and not surprisingly, local conditions affected – and continue to affect – the 
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implementation of legal reforms as they occurred throughout Latin Amer-
ica, so that the story of adoption and implementation of adversarial reforms 
in any particular Latin American nation bears the unique stamp of those 
specific conditions (see e.g. Hammergren 2007; Langer 2007; Pulecio-
Boek 2014, 93-108). While the process of transitioning from one system to 
the next has not always been smooth and without controversy, there is no 
current significant opposition to the implementation of an adversarial jus-
tice model in the countries that have committed to the process. Whether 
we look at the process in Guatemala (Hendrix 1998) or Ecuador (Johnson 
2013) or Mexico (Wright 2010) or Chile (Tiede 2008), the pattern remains 
the same: inquisitorial practices giving way to adversarial trial processes, 
particularly in the replacement of judge-led admission of written evidence 
by lawyer-conducted oral witness examination (Pulecio-Boek 2014, 100). 
A few Latin American nations – Brazil, Cuba, and Uruguay – have not 
joined the parade of its neighbors turning to adversarial models as a way of 
reforming their criminal justice systems. In the case of Cuba, its socialist 
government is largely ideologically isolated from jurisprudence in the rest 
of Latin America. Uruguay, according to a number of Uruguayan scholars 
and legal experts, has had various reforms of its criminal justice system 
stymied by political reactions and counter-reactions to problems created by 
former dictatorial governmental regimes (Ronzoni 2008).
Brazil, divided by language from other Latin American countries, 
was thereby insulated from the transnational legal activism of promot-
ers of adversarial reforms like Alberto Binder, who traveled and lectured 
in Spanish-speaking Latin America in support of the reforms (Langer 
2007, 653-654). Brazilian legal reformers like Ada Pellegrini Grinover 
concentrated their efforts on more piecemeal reform of the Brazilian jus-
tice system rather than on its wholesale replacement (Langer 2007, 665). 
However, the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, in Article 5, Clause LV, for 
the first time introduced certain adversarial elements into the otherwise 
fully inquisitorial criminal justice system by giving litigants the right to 
collect and present evidence in the fact-finding process (da Silva 2009, 14). 
This constitutional reform was later specifically implemented by a statute 
enacted in 2008 that explicitly guaranteed litigants the right to directly 
question witnesses at trial (other than the defendant, who continues to 
be initially questioned by the judge). Previously, only the judge could 
introduce evidence or question witnesses, with the litigants limited to 
merely suggesting questions to the judge, who might choose to ask them 
or not. Still, the current procedures as enacted are not fully adversarial, 
since judges are permitted under the 2008 statute to ask questions of wit-
nesses for purposes of clarification, and judges still control the admission 
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of documentary evidence in trials (da Silva 2009, 37-38). A Brazilian legal 
scholar recently concluded that, notwithstanding these constitutional and 
statutory changes, the Brazilian system remains a largely inquisitorial one, 
since it is harder to change ingrained behaviors of judges and lawyers than 
it is to change the laws (da Silva 2009, 67-78, 80-81).
2.2. European transitional models from inquisitorial
 toward adversarial trials
Looking at continental Europe, the birthplace of the inquisitorial model, 
so many elements of the adversarial system are being integrated into 
European practice that some scholars (e.g. Bradley 1996; Ogg 2013) 
speak of European justice systems as becoming convergent with common 
law-derived adversarial models. In some cases, adversarial style evidentiary 
procedures have been added to systems where judges continue to play the 
prominent role that the inquisitorial system has traditionally reserved for 
them. In other cases, wholesale statutory reforms have displaced the tra-
ditional inquisitorial systems and replaced them with adversarial systems. 
The example of Italy shows the challenges inherent in that kind of 
full-bore reform. In 1988, Italy statutorily implemented an adversarial 
justice system, requiring that live witness testimony be used at trial except 
in very limited circumstances. Judges no longer had a pre-trial investiga-
tory role, and the presentation of evidence was vested in the hands of the 
lawyers rather than the judge (van Cleave 1997; Ogg 2012). Immediately 
there was pushback, primarily from judges unhappy about being displaced 
from their central role and from prosecutors who faced the burden of 
having to use live witnesses instead of the written witness statements that 
they formerly relied upon (Illuminati 2005, 573-574). Indeed, judges and 
prosecutors were natural allies in opposing adversarial reforms because of 
strong bonds of professional identity and solidarity; Italian prosecutors 
and judges share the same training and career trajectories, belong to the 
same professional association, and are regulated by the same body, whereas 
defense lawyers are instead trained and regulated in the same way that 
other non-criminal lawyers are (Grande 2000, 236). Judges and prosecu-
tors appealed many of the provisions of the 1988 criminal procedure code 
to Italy’s Constitutional Court, which in 1989 invalidated much of that 
code as unconstitutional (Panzavolta 2005, 597-599). In 1992, Parliament 
tried to implement a less sweeping version of adversarial reform, and again 
the Constitutional Court struck down the legislation as unconstitutional 
(Panzavolta, 599-600). Five years later, Parliament tried yet again, passing a 
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statute that abolished the use of written witness statements as a substitute 
for live testimony; not surprisingly, the Constitutional Court ruled these 
reforms unlawful the following year. 
It was becoming apparent that the Italian Parliament was commit-
ted to criminal justice reforms in evidentiary practices and it was equally 
apparent that the Constitutional Court would not permit those reforms to 
be implemented. In 1999, the Italian Parliament amended the constitution 
to guarantee the right to adversarial evidentiary practices in criminal cases; 
these constitutional changes were followed in 2001 by amendments to the 
criminal procedure code giving specificity to the provisions added to the 
Italian constitution (Illuminati 2005, 577-578). In a series of cases brought 
before the Constitutional Court between 2000 and 2002, the Court held 
that the adversarial provisions in the criminal procedure code were con-
stitutional, in light of the amendments made to the constitution (Panza-
volte 2005, 615). While this ended the formal legal contest as to whether 
Italy would have an adversarial or an inquisitorial justice system, one must 
wonder whether the same social and ideological forces that propelled the 
contest between the court and the legislature may still be at play in the 
actual implementation of the current justice system in Italy (see Panzavolte 
2005, 609 for argument that judicial ideology fueled this struggle between 
the legislature and the judiciary).
A number of other European nations have introduced aspects of adver-
sarial practices into their justice systems to one degree or another. Russia, 
for example, has modified its inquisitorial systems by grafting substantial 
adversarial elements into their trial systems in its 2002 reforms (Thaman 
2008; Mack 2012). Poland, which had begun to add adversarial evidentiary 
practices into its justice system in recent decades, has accelerated that trend 
by implementing a new criminal procedure code in 2013 (effective in July 
2015) giving lawyers virtually full control over the admission of evidence 
and allowing judicial participation only under extraordinary circumstances 
(Roclawska and Bulut 2014). Across the European Union, the European 
Court of Human Rights has itself imposed some features characteristics of 
the adversarial system as essential to protect the human rights of European 
citizens (Bradley 1996; van Koppen and Penrod 2003). European com-
mercial arbitration practices, like international commercial arbitration 
practices elsewhere in the world, are eschewing their traditional inquisi-
torial evidentiary practices for more adversarial ways of fact presentation. 
For example, the website of the Swedish Arbitration Association touts its 
arbitration procedures to potential arbitration litigants, saying “The proce-
dure is principally adversarial as opposed to inquisitorial, with the parties 
themselves essentially controlling the facts and evidence to be introduced. 
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In particular, examination of witnesses is conducted by counsel for the 
parties” (Swedish Arbitration Association website 2016).
2.3. East Asian evolution from inquisitorial
 toward adversarial trial models
In East Asia, too, legal systems that had arisen through transplantation 
from continental European inquisitorial systems have begun to adopt 
more and more adversarial features. Japan has undergone several waves of 
structural legal reform (Feeley and Miyazawa 2002; Mack 2012; Nakao 
and Tsumagari 2012) that have brought many attributes of the adversarial 
model into their system. Taiwan implemented wholesale reforms of its 
criminal justice system in the process of its transition from authoritarian 
martial law to democracy (Wang 2002), culminating in the implementa-
tion of an adversarial justice system in its Criminal Procedure Code of 
2003 (Lewis 2009; Li R. 2015). China can trace the roots of its modern 
legal system to German, Japanese, and Soviet models, such that the 1979 
Criminal Procedure Code could fairly be described as a purely inquisito-
rial system where lawyers played at best a marginal role (Li L. and Ma 
2010). However, the 1996 Chinese Criminal Procedure Code brought in a 
number of adversarial features in the taking of evidence at trial (Lancaster 
and Ding 2006; Peerenboom 2006, 844; Li L. and Ma 2010; McConnell 
2011), and the 2013 significant amendments to that Code continued that 
process of change from a completely inquisitorial system to one with sub-
stantial adversarial characteristics (Ming and Dai 2014). 
In the case of Japan, the most recent waves of legal reform in the 1990s 
and early 2000s have had significant impact on not only how litigation is 
practiced by legal professionals, but also how potential litigants have come 
to see litigation as a viable option for dispute resolution. In contrast to the 
traditional stereotype that Japanese culture serves to inhibit citizens from 
resorting to formal litigation, the last two decades have seen a dramatic 
rise in civil trial litigation (Ginsburg and Hoetker 2006). Reforms in Japa-
nese legal education, namely, the importation of American-style lawyer 
training, have made lawyers more comfortable with lawyer-centered adver-
sarial litigation (Wilson 2010), and the rapid expansion of the Japanese bar 
while the number of judges has remained relatively constant (Ginsburg 
and Hoetker 2006, 38) has tipped the balance of power between judges 
and lawyers, allowing more lawyer-centric adversarial processes to prevail 
over potential resistance on the part of judges to losing their position of 
discursive control over the courtroom.
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3. Advantages and disadvantages of adversarial
 versus inquisitorial trial models
Given this sweeping global trend, one must ask whether the replacement 
of inquisitorial systems with adversarial ones is a good thing or a bad 
thing. Comparative legal scholars have often debated the question of 
which type of system is preferable. The answer to that question depends, 
of course, on what one means by labeling a system ‘preferable.’ Some 
scholars have asked, which system produces the most factually accurate 
verdicts? In other words, will an adversarial or an inquisitorial system 
result in the fewest miscarriages of justice? Some (e.g. Slobogin 2014) 
have argued that inquisitorial systems are less prone to erroneous ver-
dicts, while others (e.g. Park 2003; Brants 2012) have maintained that 
adversarial systems are better at reaching correct results. One fact is clear – 
both inquisitorial and adversarial systems have been shown to sometimes 
fail when scientific evidence such as DNA results prove the fallibility of 
verdicts obtained (van Koppen and Penrod 2003). Because we have no 
verifiable way of measuring the ultimate accuracy of fact-finding, probably 
we can never know for certain which system is a more reliable route to 
true factual findings. 
Other scholars, recognizing that we cannot determine which system 
might be more accurate, have asked instead the question, which system 
is more efficient? That is, does either the inquisitorial or the adversarial 
system impose lower economic costs on society? Again, economists have 
lined up on both sides of the argument (cf. Block 2000; Froeb and Koba-
yahsi 2012), so an economic analysis of this question turns out likewise to 
be unclear as to which might be better. 
3.1. Procedural justice implications of moving from inquisitorial
 to adversarial trials
In this section, I will focus on a slightly different aspect of the question of 
which system might be preferable, by asking which system might provide 
greater procedural justice. Answering that question will first examine the 
contrasting ways in which legal narratives get created in each system, and 
will lead to a consideration of which typology of narrative construction 
is likely to be more satisfying to those who participate in and experience 
the results of the justice system. In other words, it is necessary to weigh 
the contrasting procedural justice implications of both systems in assessing 
their relative merits. 
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3.1.1. Procedural justice contrasted with substantive justice:
 what makes people think a legal system is fair?
Procedural justice differs from substantive justice. Substantive justice is 
done when the verdict of the court is factually correct, that is, when an 
accurate determination of the facts occurs and the law is correctly applied 
to those facts. Procedural justice, on the other hand, addresses a very dif-
ferent aspect of fundamental justice, one which is directly tied to litigant 
satisfaction with the process itself through a belief that the system has 
operated in a fundamentally fair manner (Thibaut and Walker 1978; Solum 
2004). One might well ask, why care at all about procedural justice? Isn’t 
it enough if trial verdicts end up being factually and legally correct? To 
understand why procedural justice might matter, social psychologist Tom 
Tyler in the 1970s began a lifelong study of analyzing why people obey 
the law. What he discovered through thousands of survey questionnaires 
(Tyler 1990) was that people obey the law, not because they fear being 
punished if they break the law, but because they feel the law and its atten-
dant legal processes seem fair to them. When the legal order seemed to 
the respondents to be unjust, unfair, inaccessible, or corrupt, they thought 
of the legal system as illegitimate, and tended to evade the laws when they 
thought they could get away with doing so. On the other hand, when they 
imagined the workings of the legal system to be fair, they tended to obey 
the law even when they did not necessarily agree with its substance. 
This discovery then raised for Tyler a second question: what makes 
people think that their legal system is a fair one, worth obeying even when 
the respondents believed they could flout the law without being caught? 
One intuitively appealing idea is that those who had prevailed in legal dis-
putes would come to think of the legal system as just and fair, while losers 
in disputes would conclude that the system is unjust and unfair. Surpris-
ingly, however, this is not what Tyler’s survey research found. Instead, 
people who felt that the process had treated them fairly had positive feel-
ings, even if they had not won their cases, whereas even winners did not 
feel positively about the system if they felt they had been treated unfairly 
in the process. Being treated fairly, according to the survey answers, had 
three components: that the party felt able to give voice to their side of 
the story; that the adjudicator gave evidence that they had been listened 
to; and that throughout the process, the party felt that they were treated 
with dignity and respect. Other research (see summaries of this research 
in MacCoun 2005) replicated Tyler’s findings in both civil and criminal 
cases, and in a variety of countries and cultures. For example, researchers 
studying litigants in American small claims courts – where lawyers are not 
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permitted and litigants plead their own cases – found that litigant satisfac-
tion with the process was highest when litigants felt they had had a fair 
opportunity to tell their side of the story and that they were listened to 
by the judge. Ironically, many of these litigants presented narratives that 
were insufficient to satisfy the legal elements of their cases, but losing the 
case did not appear to sour their perception of the fairness of the process 
(O’Barr and Conley 1985). Winning or losing one’s case, it appears, may 
not be the major determinant in how people judge the fairness of their 
legal systems. 
3.1.2. Trial discourse and procedural justice
These studies on procedural justice suggest that discursive differences 
between adversarial and inquisitorial systems that relate to procedural 
justice factors – being able to tell one’s story, being listened to, and being 
treated with respect in the process – might be significant in judging which 
system is preferable, and even in determining which features of each 
system should be considered desirable to best promote public perceptions 
of fairness and legitimacy in a legal system. The contrasting manners in 
which legal narratives are constructed in each system result in discursive 
regimes that may have significance for the procedural justice perceptions 
of the parties and the public. Lawyer control of presentation of evidence 
in the adversarial system can be contrasted with the inquisitorial trial in 
which legal narratives are second-order constructions of judges, fashioned 
from written information obtained largely outside the courtroom process. 
Inquisitorial discursive practices inherently provide less opportunity 
for litigants to shape their cases and control the legal narratives in the trial. 
Since the judge decides what information will be presented at trial, the 
legal narrative constructed at trial of what happened and what it means 
is exclusively within the control of the judge. Parties have no control over 
the judge’s narrative and cannot seek to construct their own narrative, even 
as a potentially competing narrative to that of the judge. Under those cir-
cumstances, the litigants and other witnesses have no space in which they 
can attempt to have their stories heard, so that they lose both voice – the 
opportunity to tell the court what matters to them – and the chance to be 
listened to as well, and thus to be accorded respect through the process of 
being deemed worthy of being formally heard. True, the inquisitorial judge 
can choose to open a space for litigants to express their side of the story, 
but if this occurs, it is as a kind of grace or favor, not as of right. And, given 
the preference of inquisitorial courts for written witness statements over 
oral testimony, parties and witnesses in practice seldom have the chance for 
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such grace to be shown to them. Since their oral testimony is not needed, 
they are symbolically and literally excluded from the fact-finding process. 
Procedural justice research would predict that this exclusion from the pro-
cess of the construction of the legal narrative that gives meaning to the 
case would leave the witnesses and parties to such proceedings less likely 
to conclude that the process was essentially fair, regardless of the outcome. 
Indeed, this is precisely what was found in a study (Sevier 2014) in which 
European respondents were asked to assess proposed dispute resolution 
practices for extra-legal community disputes. Despite the respondents 
having come from countries with historically inquisitorial practices, which 
we might expect they would tend to favor out of familiarity, most subjects 
instead favored more adversarial processes when they were asked to choose 
which kinds of processes they thought would be most fair. 
In contrast, adversarial systems – at least in theory – would seem struc-
tured to enhance procedural justice perceptions of litigants. Adversarial 
processes vest the creation of legal narratives with the lawyers, who are 
structurally the agents of the litigants and act in their interests and under 
their direction. Presumably, the litigants should be able to exercise control 
over the lawyer-directed construction of legal narrative in court in a way 
which is impossible in an inquisitorial court. Even witnesses who are not 
parties to the litigation are more central to the dispute resolution process 
in the adversarial system – since witness testimony is overwhelming when 
provided orally in court – as opposed to inquisitorial systems, in which 
most evidence is admitted at trial only through written statements pro-
duced outside the trial process. If being able to tell one’s story directly and 
be listened to is central to inculcating a sense of procedural justice, then 
adversarial processes seem far more likely to result in positive perceptions 
of procedural justice by those who participate in them than would inquisi-
torial systems.
3.1.3. Lawyer-centered trial discourse as a barrier
 to achieving procedural justice in adversarial trial systems
Unfortunately, in practice there are barriers within the norms of trial prac-
tice in many adversarial systems that undermine that structural advantage 
in procedural justice. In particular, the practices in the United States fail to 
deliver on the potential that adversarial systems could provide with respect 
to procedural justice. The reason is simple: adversarial trials as actually 
practiced vest the creation of legal narratives, not with the litigants and 
witnesses, or even with the neutral judges, but instead with the parties’ 
lawyers. Despite the ideological norm that lawyers act under the direction 
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and control of their clients, the reality is that lawyers themselves determine 
the unfolding of trial evidence with little or no such client control (Park 
2003). Lawyers in court ask precise, detailed questions that, especially 
during cross-examination, witnesses can merely assent to or reject. Lim-
ited to saying “yes” or “no” in response to the lawyers’ questions, witnesses 
are deprived of the ability to tell their story in the terms they think are sig-
nificant. In essence, the language in which the testimony is given in adver-
sarial courtrooms is provided by the lawyers, not the witnesses. Witnesses 
cannot volunteer information but must instead wait for the lawyers to ask 
questions of them, even when the witnesses feel that important evidence 
has been left out of their testimony. Lawyers see the process of question-
ing witnesses as merely the vehicle through which they establish the raw 
data needed to argue their theory of the case in closing argument, not as a 
mechanism to discover information that the fact-finder will need in order 
to reach a true verdict (see, e.g., trial manuals offering advice to trial law-
yers, such as Jeans 1999; Mauet 2007). Even in a recently-published lawyer 
training manual that claims to be promoting less rigid lawyer control over 
witness questioning, the sample cross-examinations that it provides to the 
reader consist of sequences of lawyer questions that allow little scope for 
witnesses to determine the shape of their testimony (McComas 2011). It 
is the very dynamics of the lawyer-centered adversarial model that ensure 
that the content of witness testimony is almost exclusively under the direc-
tion and control of the lawyers. 
It is true that witnesses and litigants in inquisitorial systems may feel 
estranged from the process through which their cases will ultimately be 
resolved because the development of legal narratives in inquisitorial courts 
is literally distant and indirect from their participation. However, lawyer 
control over legal narratives in adversarial courts is more obvious to the 
witnesses and litigants, who sit present in court while the lawyers maintain 
their iron grip on the construction of the legal narratives at trial. Worse 
yet, lawyer exertion of control over testimony can constitute a personal 
face-threat to the witness (cf. Goffman 1955) because the examining 
lawyer has the power to select the precise language through the question-
ing format in which the witness testimony will be given. Witnesses who 
experience this process are forced to agree with characterizations provided 
by the lawyer; they in effect have words ‘put into their mouths’ by the 
lawyers. 
Tight lawyer control over the process of the development of witness 
testimony is compounded when it is the sole province of the lawyers to 
organize the admitted testimony into a coherent legal narrative, such that 
witnesses may feel that the lawyers have distorted, ignored, or reframed 
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their experiences in this process. Although inquisitorial trials also exclude 
witnesses from this process of the framing of a coherent legal narrative at 
trial, this interpretive work is done by judges, out of the presence of the 
witnesses, and so may be less jarring to the witnesses’ perceptions of the 
fairness of the trial. A witness in an inquisitorial courtroom never sees the 
reframing of her written witness statement and may be forever unaware of 
the ways in which the judge has distorted the written evidence through 
that interpretive reframing process. 
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, the wide-spread adoption of adversarial trial practices in 
many parts of the world will undoubtedly have some kind of impact on 
how the participants in those trials – both legal professionals and litigants – 
experience and evaluate the trial process. Of course, it must always be borne 
in mind that the consequences of importing any kind of significant change 
into any dynamic system such as a legal system are not at all a foregone 
conclusion. When those changes come from the outside, the end results 
are even more indeterminate, as we have already observed in the case of 
mixed results of the importation of adversarial practices into the legal 
systems of Asia, Latin America, and Europe. As Mirjan Damaska (1997, 
839) put it, when rules and practices get imported into a legal system, 
“unintended consequences are likely to follow in living law. And while 
some of these consequences can turn out to be a pleasant surprise, others 
can be very disappointing”. There will be no single outcome as many 
national legal systems come to incorporate adversarial evidentiary practices 
into their law, but rather a panoply of possible outcomes, sensitive to local 
contextual factors. 
Recognizing that, it must be understood that adversarial processes have 
the potential to promote positive perceptions in the public of the procedural 
fairness of the justice system by giving litigants and witnesses a more direct 
experience of being able to shape their own legal narratives and of having an 
opportunity to have their stories heard and respected in court. That advan-
tage, however, will be undermined when tight lawyer control of the trial 
process occurs, as has historically been the case in many common law adver-
sarial nations such as the United States. For the greatest enhancement of 
procedural justice, the newly developing and emerging adversarial systems 
might consider how to rebalance the control of legal narratives by giving 
witnesses and litigants greater discursive control over their own testimony. 
Procedural Justice and the Discursive Construction of Narratives at Trial
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At a junction in history in which concepts of legal legitimacy and the rule of 
law are being questioned even in Western liberal democracies, legal systems 
can ill afford to ignore the procedural justice consequences attendant to the 
discourse regimes in which their legal systems dispense justice.
References
Bischoff, James L. 2003. “Reforming the Criminal Procedure System in Latin Amer-
ica”. Texas Hispanic Journal of Law and Policy 9: 27-55. 
Block, Michael K. 2000. “An Experimental Comparison of Adversarial versus Inquisi-
torial Procedural Regimes”. American Law and Economics Review 2: 170-193. 
Bradley, Craig M. 1996. “The Convergence of the Continental and the Common Law 
Models of Criminal Procedure”. Criminal Law Forum 7: 471-484. 
Brants, Chrisje. 2012. “Wrongful Convictions and Inquisitorial Process: The Case of 
the Netherlands”. University of Cincinnati Law Review 80: 1069-1124. 
Damaska, Mirjan. 1997. “The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-
American and Continental European Experiments”. American Journal of Com-
parative Law 45: 839-852.
da Silva, R.A.T.C. 2009. The Brazilian Criminal Procedure: An Adversarial System 
Chained to an Inquisitorial Tradition. L.L.M. Thesis, Harvard Law School.
Del Duca, Patrick. 2011. “Rule of Law and the Contribution of Lawyers to Deepen-
ing Latin American Financial Models”. Southwest Journal of International Law 
18: 125-136.
Feeley, Malcolm, and Setsuo Miyazawa. 2002. The Japanese Adversary System in Con-
text. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Froeb, Luke M., and Bruce H. Kobayashi. 2012. “Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Jus-
tice”. In Procedural Law and Economics, edited by Chris William Sanchirico, 
1-18. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Ginsburg, Tom, and Glenn Hoetker. 2006. “The Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical 
Analysis of Japan’s Turn to Litigation”. Journal of Legal Studies 35: 31-56.
Goffman, Erving. 1955. “On Face-work: An Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social 
Interaction”. Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes 18: 213-
231.
Grande, Elisabetta. 2000. “Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance”. Amer-
ican Journal of Comparative Law 48: 227-259. 
Hammergren, Linn. 2007. Envisioning Reform: Improving Judicial Efficiency in Latin 
America. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Hendrix, Steven E. 1998. “Innovation in Criminal Procedure in Latin America: Gua-
temala’s Conversion to the Adversarial System”. Southwest Journal of Law and 
Trade in the Americas 5: 365-405.
94
Janet Ainsworth
Lingue Culture Mediazioni / Languages Cultures Mediation – 4 (2017) 1
http://www.ledonline.it/LCM-Journal/
Illuminati, Giulio. 2005. “The Frustrated Turn to Adversarial Procedure in Italy”. 
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 4: 567-582.
Jeans, James W. 1999. Trial Advocacy. Minneapolis: West Publishing. 
Johnson, Thea. 2013. “Latin Justice: A New Look”. World Policy Journal 30: 57-71.
Lancaster, Robert, and Xiangshun Ding. 2006. “Addressing the Emergence of Advo-
cacy in the Chinese Criminal Justice System”. Fordham International Law 
Journal 30: 356-410.
Langer, Máximo. 2007. “Revolution in the Latin American Criminal Process: Diffu-
sion from the Periphery”. American Journal of Comparative Law 55: 617-676. 
Lewis, Margaret K. 2009. “Taiwan’s New Adversarial System and the Overlooked 
Challenge of Efficiency-driven Reforms”. Virginia Journal of International Law 
49: 652-726.
Li, Liying, and Yue Ma. 2010. “Adjudication and Legal Reforms in Contemporary 
China”. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 26: 36-52. 
Li, Rong-geng. 2015. “From an Inquisitorial to an Adversarial System: The Recent 
Development in Criminal Justice of Taiwan”. In The Functional Transforma-
tion of Courts: Taiwan and Korea in Comparison, edited by Jiunn-rong Yeh, 
239-266. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.
MacCoun, Robert J. 2005. “Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-edged Sword 
of Procedural Fairness”. Annual Review of Law and Social Science 1: 171-201.
Mack, Raneta Lawson. 2012. “Reestablishing Jury Trials in Japan: Foundational Les-
sons from the Russian Experience”. Creighton International and Comparative 
Law Journal 2: 100-115. 
Mauet, Thomas A. 2007. Trial Techniques. Philadelphia: Wolters Kluwer.
McComas, James H. 2011. Dynamic Cross Examination. Portland (OR): Trial Guides. 
McConnell, Moira. 2011. Criminal Justice in China: An Empirical Inquiry. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
Ming, Hu, and Mengyan Dai. 2014. “Confidence in the Criminal Justice System: Dif-
ferences between Citizens and Criminal Justice Officials in China”. Criminology 
and Criminal Justice 14: 502-524.
Nakao, Keisuke, and Masatoshi Tsumagari. 2012. “Pseudo-adversarialism: A Theoreti-
cal Comparison between the US and Japanese Criminal Procedures”. The BE 
Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 12: 1-44.
O’Barr, William M., and John M. Conley. 1985. “Litigant Satisfaction versus Legal 
Adequacy in Small Claims Court Narratives”. Law and Society Review 19: 661-
702.
Ogg, James Thomas. 2012. “Italian Criminal Trials: Lost in Transition? Differing 
Degrees of Criminal Justice Convergence in Italy and Australia”. International 
Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 36: 229-264.
Ogg, James Thomas. 2013. “Adversary and Adversity: Converging Adversarial and 
Inquisitorial Systems of Justice. A Case Study of the Italian Criminal Trial 
Reforms”. International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 
37: 31-59. 
Procedural Justice and the Discursive Construction of Narratives at Trial
95
Lingue Culture Mediazioni / Languages Cultures Mediation – 4 (2017) 1
http://www.ledonline.it/LCM-Journal/
Panzavolta, Michele. 2005. “Reforms and Counter-reforms in the Italian Struggle for 
an Accusatorial Criminal Law System”. North Carolina Journal of International 
Law and Commercial Regulation 30: 577-624.
Park, Roger C. 2003. “Adversarial Influence on the Interrogation of Trial Witnesses”. 
In Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Justice, edited by Peter J. van Koppen and 
Steven D. Penrod, 131-166. New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Peerenboom, Randall. 2006. “What Have We Learned about Law and Development? 
Describing, Predicting, and Assessing Legal Reforms in China”. Michigan 
Journal of International Law 27: 823-871.
Pulecio-Boek, Daniel. 2014. “The Geneology of Prosecutorial Discretion in Latin 
America: A Comparative and Historical Analysis of the Adversarial Reforms 
in the Region”. Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 13: 65-145.
Roclawska, Monika, and Adam Bulut. 2014. “Toward an American Model of Crimi-
nal Process: The Reform of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure”. Baltic 
Journal of Law and Politics 7: 1-11.
Ronzoni, Raúl. 2008. Reforma al Sistema Penal y Carcelario en Uruguay. Montevi-
deo: Fundación CADAL (Centro para la Apertura y el Desarrollo de América 
Latina).
Sevier, Justin. 2014. “The Truth-justice Tradeoff: Perceptions of Decisional Accuracy 
and Procedural Justice in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal Systems”. Psy-
chology, Public Policy, and Law 20: 212-224.
Slobogin, Christopher. 2014. “Lessons from Inquisitorialism”. Southern California 
Law Review 87: 699-742. 
Solum, Lawrence B. 2004. University of San Diego Law and Economics Research Paper 
04-02 (Procedural Justice).
Swedish Arbitration Association website. 2016. http://swedisharbitration.se/about-
arbitration-in-sweden/.
Thaman, Stephen C. 2008. “Jury Trial and Adversary Procedure in Russia: Reform of 
Soviet Inquisitorial Procedure or Democratic Window-dressing?”. In Russia 
and Its Constitution: Promise and Political Reality, edited by Gordon B. Smith 
and Robert S. Sharlet, 141-180. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV.
Thibaut, John, and Laurens Walker. 1978. “A Theory of Procedure”. California Law 
Review 66: 541-566. 
Tiede, Lydia Brashear. 2008. “Chile’s Experiment in Criminal Law Reform: Conver-
sion from an Inquisitorial to Adversarial System”. In Midwestern Political Sci-
ence Association, 2008 Annual Meeting Conference Papers.
Tyler, Tom R. 1990. Why People Obey the Law. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University 
Press. 
van Cleave, Rachel A. 1997. “Italy Changed to Adversarial Criminal Model”. Emory 
International Law Review 11: 419-469. 
van Koppen, Peter J., and Steven D. Penrod. 2003. “Adversarial or Inquisitorial: Com-
paring Systems”. In Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Justice, edited by Peter J. van 
Koppen and Steven D. Penrod, 1-19. New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
96
Janet Ainsworth
Lingue Culture Mediazioni / Languages Cultures Mediation – 4 (2017) 1
http://www.ledonline.it/LCM-Journal/
Wang, Tay-sheng. 2002. “The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th Century: 
Toward a Liberal and Democratic Country”. Pacific Rim Law and Policy Jour-
nal 11: 531-560.
Watts, Michelle, and Kimberly Dannels Ruff. 2012. “Drugs, Thugs, and the Diablos 
Rojos: Perils and Progress in Panama”. Latin American Policy 3: 208-234. 
Wilson, Matthew J. 2010. “U.S. Legal Education Methods and Ideals: Application 
to the Japanese and Korean Systems”. Cardozo Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 18: 295-317.
Wright, Ronald F. 2010. “Mexican Drug Violence and Adversarial Experiments”. 
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 35: 
363-389.
